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Executive Summary
The issues that motivate Syria's rebel groups and shape inter-rebel interactions can be challenging to identify. To better understand these dynamics, this report investigates the question: Why have Syria's Sunni Arab rebels failed to unify? We first address this issue by exploring the literature on rebel group interactions in the context of civil wars. This literature stresses two factors-a group's goals and resource levels-in how rebel groups decide to cooperate, ignore, or compete with their rebel counterparts. In general, groups with similar goals and resources are more likely to interact but less likely to develop deep alliances. Groups with similar goals and differing levels of resources are more likely to develop deep ties, as the smaller group might be willing to sacrifice some of its autonomy for greater access to resources. Groups with divergent goals are less likely to develop deep ties and more likely to compete, especially if they have asymmetric resource levels.
We use this framework to examine how goals and resources could be affecting rebel alliance building in Syria. We first identify the major segments of the Sunni Arab rebellion and discuss their key goals. We then discuss how rebel groups have acquired resources through the external support of foreign states and wealthy private donors. We then analyze how divergent goals and resource levels appear to have influenced rebel alliance building and the rebellion during the first year of the armed conflict (January 2012-February 2013). Finally, we discuss what the trends in alliance building could mean for the future of the Syrian civil war and its aftermath.
Our analysis suggests several key trends in alliance building among Syria's rebels:
 Divergent goals and resources have likely played a significant role in determining how and to what extent rebel groups in Syria interact.
 Differing short-term goals have in part led to the abundance of small groups and their often parochial agendas.
 Differing goals have affected not only how groups see each other but also how outside donors see them.
 The ability to gain access to resources via wealthy private donors has had the effect of encouraging rebel forces to divide into smaller and smaller independent groups.
 Salafis have been the most successful at attracting private support which has given them an edge over other rebel factions in resource procurement.
 Shared long-term goals and greater access to resources from private donors have encouraged more credible alliance building among Salafi militants than among their more divided secular rebel counterparts.
Theoretical literature leads us to make four observations on how trends in rebel alliance building could impact the future of conflict in Syria:
 The presence of multiple groups with low levels of cooperation and independent access to external support could lengthen the duration of the Syrian conflict.
 Rebel victory will prove more difficult without the development of deeper alliances. The failure to establish strong credible alliances could also lead to more post-conflict instability should the rebels defeat Asad.
 Access to higher levels of resources would have the most significant impact on the conflict and would make rebel victory more likely.
 However, the presence of greater resources could also create more competition between rebel groups, especially between those with divergent goals and asymmetric resources levels.
A note on sources: Due to the fogginess of civil war in Syria, it is impossible to determine the veracity of reports coming out of the country. With the conflict still relatively young, we have depended largely on on-the-ground reporting and interviews with rebel leaders, commanders, and soldiers by journalists; eyewitness statements; and public statements by rebel groups, either through traditional media channels or through their official websites and social network pro-3 files. In addition to these primary sources, we have benefited from the theoretical insights provided by an array of literature on civil wars, rebel alliance building, and the impact of external funding on insurgencies. We have also consulted other analytical treatments on Syria's rebel groups and more general historical literature on Syria.
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The longer it takes, the more groups and agendas get involved, and the more people from outside complicate our battles. The longer it takes, the more complex it becomes.
-Abd al-Aziz, a commander in the Free Syrian Army 1
Introduction
Syria has been ravaged by armed conflict. The militarized struggle that has pitted rebel groups against the Baathist government has caused hundreds of thousands of families to be displaced, destroyed entire neighborhoods in important urban centers, and sharply divided Syrian society along sectarian, ethnic, and political lines. Although the opposition to Bashar al-Asad's regime has grown to include a multitude of groups, it has failed to cohere into a unified bloc. To a large extent, the divisions within the opposition reflect those latent within Syrian society itself; however, they are also deeply rooted in the complex dynamics of civil war.
This report asks the question: Why have Syrian rebel forces failed to unify? Although the Syrian opposition has been able to establish a number of factions, committees, and institutions in name, it remains seriously divided both outside and inside the country. There is perhaps no better evidence of this than the sheer number and highly fractured nature of armed rebel groups and gangs operating on the ground in Syria. Indeed, the trend for some armed groups has been not to unite but rather to further divide into smaller battalions, each with an independent commander focused on attracting outside funding and support.
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To help answer our question, we examine the literature on rebel alliance building and the importance of rebel group interactions to civil war outcomes. This literature stresses two key factors in how groups decide to either cooperate or compete with each other: goals and resources. Goals are the ideas and issues that motivate a group's actions and drive its decision-making. While most rebel groups in a civil war share the immediate goal of toppling the government, many disagree on what system should replace it. Resources are the weapons, infrastructure, networks, and funds that provide a group with the means to subsist and fight in an armed conflict. In general, shared goals between groups can help facilitate cooperation, whereas divergent goals can drive competition. Resource levels are also a consideration. As cooperation invariably dilutes a group's autonomy, the incentive toward working with other outfits tends to be driven by a group's desire to gain access to greater resources. For this reason, groups with differing access to resources but shared goals are more likely to cooperate with one another than groups with similar resources and goals.
We use these theoretical insights to help us understand how goals and resources have shaped rebel dynamics in Syria over a year of the armed rebellion (from January 2012 through January 2013 If inter-group alliances strengthen a rebellion and increase its chances of victory over a government, why are they so difficult to form? What factors serve to motivate or discourage ties among rebel groups? Are certain rebel groups more inclined to develop credible ties with their peers? These are some of the questions tackled by Christine Furtado in her work on anti-government rebellions in South Asia. Furtado links a group's decision-making regarding cooperating with other groups to two main factors: a group's goals and its resources. In this typology, goals include the politics, ideology, ethnicity, religion, regional preferences, or parochial interests that motivate a group's behavior and help define its near-and long-term objectives. A group's goals are generally not fixed, but rather can change over 9 time and in reaction to shifting conflict dynamics. Resources include the finances, materiel, social networks, infrastructure, foreign assistance (e.g., funding, military supplies, the provision of safe-havens, etc.), and technologies that can strengthen a rebel group's armed campaign against its enemies. Whereas goals help define an organization and "drive its strategic choices," resources determine a group's "ability to sustain conflict" and its approach to "recruitment, size, and structure." Cordial alliance "characterized by mutual tolerance…achieved tacitly or through an explicit agreement not to target force at each other."
Rebel alliances in civil wars
Cooperative alliance "groups form a united front for joint participation in negotiations with the government…involves a higher level of cooperation than cordial alliances, but groups do not necessarily concede control over their forces or resources."
Coordination alliance "groups cooperate with each other to conduct joint operations against the state or conduct joint training operations, but do not merge their command and control structures."
Militarized alliance "involves the unification of forces and integration of command and control structures…the total merger of one group into another…" a. Furtado, "Inter-Rebel Group Dynamics," pp. 32-33.
This typology describes the spectrum of inter-group relations from outright hostility (competition) to complete unification or merger (militarized alliance). Although competition between groups is common, Furtado suggests that cooperative and coordination alliances are generally as far as most rebel groups will go in forging relations with others.
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Because opposition groups cannot enforce the agreements they make with one another, Furtado suggests that they are "more likely" to cooperate with groups they consider to be able to make a "credible commitment." One group determines the credibility of a prospective partner by evaluating the similarities and disparities between that group's goals and resources and its own. Furtado emphasizes the role of shared or divergent goals in determining inter-group behavior.
Rebel groups see shared goals as "an indicator of credibility," which is 11 why groups with similar worldviews and aspirations are more likely to engage in "deeper levels of cooperation" than groups with differing perspectives. Likewise, groups with highly divergent views are more likely to compete than to cooperate with one another.
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Access to resources is also an important determining factor. Groups with unequal access to resources, but similar goals, are more likely to cooperate than groups with similar resources and goals. This is primarily because stronger groups with more resources are more "capable of imposing heavy costs" on a partner group should the latter renege on an agreement. By making such agreements, the stronger group is able to expand its network while decreasing the number of potential competitors. And by aligning itself with a stronger partner, the weaker group is able to strengthen its position, avoid competing with a more formidable rival, and gain access to higher levels of resources-all of which could be a sufficient incentive even if cooperation means having less autonomy. Groups with similar goals and access to resources can cooperate; however, without gaining access to greater resources or forming ties with a stronger ally, they generally lack sufficient incentive to do so and are less inclined to "give up higher levels of control over their groups to forge deeper alliances."
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In the Syrian context, forming ties of patronage to foreign governments and wealthy private donors is crucial for gaining access to higher levels of resources. This is also true for rebel groups engaged in civil wars more broadly. For instance, in his work on transnational insurgencies, Idean Salehyan demonstrates how the support provided to rebel groups by neighboring states strengthens rebellions and increases the duration of civil war. 11 Similarly, Paul Staniland, writing on insurgent organizations, argues that external support is "crucial" for groups battling a capable government because it enables rebels to gain access to large amounts of resources and funding in a context 12 where the state has a significant infrastructural advantage. 12 He adds that for groups that lack "access to drugs or mineral wealth, the only viable means of acquiring significant wealth and materiel comes from state sponsors and diasporas outside the war zone." 13 As external support provides groups with high levels of resources, it allows them to attract and retain more fighters and helps stabilize and centralize organizational leadership. This in turn encourages group cohesion and effectiveness. Alternatively, the "absence of external support" can undermine a group's cohesion, weaken military effectiveness, and make the group vulnerable to competition with stronger rivals. 14 Syria's armed rebel forces
As we have seen, goals play an important role in determining how groups come together or compete in a civil war context. This is the case with the Syrian rebels. (For a general map of the Syrian conflict, including some of the areas of operation of the groups mentioned in this report, see figure 1.) During the past year of armed conflict in Syria, the vast majority of those rebelling against Bashar al-Asad have been Sunni Arabs-which is unsurprising, given that they constitute the majority of the country but do not control the levers of power. Although the Sunni Arab rebels share the common goal of overthrowing the Asad regime, they diverge on what the political order should be once they remove Asad from power. Although regional, local, and personal differences undoubtedly account for many of their disagreements, it is their differing opinions on the role of religion in a post-Asad state that most clearly divides them. On the extreme right of the discussion are the Salafi rebels, who want to see Islam become the sole source of law and cultural identity in Syria. However, the Salafis, which include jihadists, differ among themselves over how to achieve this. 16 Of the largest and most im- Front"), 23 July 2012 (7/23/2012), http://www.srfront.org/?p=108. In the "Charter of the Syrian Revolutionaries Front," an umbrella organization in which ASB plays the largest role, the Salafi militia repeats its aim to overthrow the Asad regime and establish Islamic rule. Its goals include implementing Islamic law, maintaining the unity of the Syrian population and territory, complying with international treaties that do not violate Islamic law Sharia, uniting the rebel groups under a single banner, coordinating with all parties working to topple the regime, and assisting politically and administratively during the transition time after the fall of the regime. 20 From the preceding discussion, we can distinguish four categories of Sunni Arab rebels based on their political goals and allegiances: Salafis, Muslim Brotherhood aligned groups, amorphous Islamists, and secularists. Most of the people in each category are local Syrians, but they have also attracted foreign donors and manpower. Salafi militant groups have in particular benefited from the infusion of foreign volunteers to man their ranks. Some groups from each category are in the FSA, and some are outside of it. In a rough comparison, the Salafis have the fewest groups in the FSA, followed by the amorphous Islamists, then groups associated with the Brotherhood, and finally the secularists, which have the most. This distribution makes sense given that the FSA's original founders were secular-minded military officers who had defected from the Asad regime. For this reason, much of the tension between Sunni rebel groups lies between groups with conflicting goals, such as the largely non-FSA-aligned Salafis and the pro-FSA secular groups.
Funding the rebellion
Although differing goals have helped fracture Syria's opposition, limited and unequal access to resources via external support has also played an important role. It is unclear precisely when foreign support started to make an impact in Syria; however, there were reports from as early as January 2012 that Saudi Arabia and Qatar had decided to fund rebels to help them acquire weapons. 25 Initially, the United States and its Western European allies did not want weapons delivered to the rebels, as they shared Jordan and Turkey's fears of exacerbating the conflict. 31 But by late spring, the United States had altered its stance and began encouraging Qatar and Saudi Arabia to provide weapons and helping the two countries send the right weapons to the right groups. There were reports, however, that the U.S. government discouraged its regional allies over the past year from supplying heavy weapons and that the CIA directly inter- vened to ensure that heavy anti-tank or anti-air weapons did not cross into Syria.
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Saudi Arabia and Qatar at first sought to deliver weapons and funds to the Free Syrian Army. The conduit was the Syrian National Council, the leading exile opposition body early in the uprising. Although the SNC had initially opposed a violent uprising, it changed its stance in March 2012, announcing that it would form a ministry of defense to unite the armed opposition under the SNC's control. 33 Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait all pledged funds to the SNC to pay rebel fighters in the FSA. 34 Libya also gave funds to the Syrian National Council, reportedly surpassing both Qatar and the UAE in its level of support. the council was substantial, as it held one quarter of the seats on the SNC over the past year. 37 Until recently, the Brotherhood also blocked efforts to dilute its power by merging the SNC with opposition groups inside Syria. 38 The Kurds have been particularly suspicious of Brotherhood influence on the SNC and the body's close connection to Turkey, viewing both as inimical to Kurdish autonomy. 39 Groups hostile to the Brotherhood allege that its members on the SNC used money the body received from Saudi, Qatar, and Turkey to rebuild the Brotherhood network in Syria by channeling it to groups who pledged them loyalty. 40 There are also indications that the Brotherhood has channeled money and weapons from private citizens to its favorite groups in Syria, including some groups that have been reportedly stockpiling materiel in expectation of a possible postAsad fight. 41 Even if many of these groups nominally fight under the banner of the Free Syrian Army, they do not necessarily answer to its leadership. The head of the Brotherhood-funded Tawhid Battalion in Aleppo declared in August 2012 that it was independent of FSA leadership despite fighting under its banner. 42 The Brotherhood's suspected manipulation of external funding has been a source of discord within the SNC. For example, in March 2012, a number of major opposition leaders left the SNC in protest over the dominance of the Brotherhood and its unwillingness to centralize financing for the rebels because it wanted to control the flow of money to the FSA.
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By the summer of 2012, some of the Gulf countries decided that the SNC was too ineffectual at distributing money and arms. 44 To overcome this infighting and the dominance of the Brotherhood on the SNC, the FSA set up its own political front, the Syrian Support Group (SSG), to directly receive funds and weapons. By late summer, Saudi Arabia had become its primary backer, with Qatar and Turkey continuing to support the SNC. According to numerous press reports, the split in funding only served to reinforce factionalism among the rebels. Private funding still flows to favorite groups, 58 undermining the chances for the creation of a larger fighting force. As one Syrian financier put it,
The local brigade commanders on the ground swear allegiance to whoever supports them and the expat community sending them money is divided. These are [Syrian] expats in the States and the Gulf using their own trusted channels for getting money through, so the money is pouring in from many different pockets. The number of fighters each commander can summon wax and wane with his ability to arm and pay them and their families, so there is no particular leader with enough clout to bring the brigades together…. All the other money comes from multiple sources and multiple channels. You can only unify these units with a unified source of money.
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Money coming from conservative citizens in the Gulf is leading some groups to emphasize their religious identity in order to attract religiously-motivated sponsors. 60 A lot of the money has gone to overtly
Salafi groups, such as Ahrar al-Sham, 61 leading to complaints by FSA commanders that the Salafi groups are better armed than they are. 
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ally. 63 News outlets have reported that the group gets most of its money from private donors in Kuwait. 64 Ahrar al-Sham partially confirmed this when it issued a statement on its Facebook page on 31 August 2012, detailing how much money it had received from a Kuwaiti committee set up to support the Syrian rebels.
Syrian expats are another major source of private funding. For example, an estimated 400,000 to 1 million Syrians work in Saudi Arabia, half of whom live in Jeddah. Thirty members of the SNC are Syrians living in Saudi Arabia, and an estimated 90,000 more Syrians have fled the conflict to stay with family in the kingdom. 65 The Saudi government reportedly leaves them alone to send money to the FSA. 66 In July 2012, Syrian citizens, together with members of the Saudi royal family, raised between $30 million and $150 million for the "support of the brothers in Syria." 67 It is unclear how, to what extent, and to whom in Syria these funds have been distributed.
Saudi Arabia has tried to clamp down on the private funding going to the most radical Islamist groups in Syria. 68 When a group of Islamic scholars in Saudi Arabia set up a committee to collect private funds for the Syrian rebels, the Saudi Intelligence Security Agency asked them to stop and sign a pledge to that effect. They also announced their pledge over the Internet. 69 The government has clamped down on clerics who are encouraging young Saudi men to go fight in Syria as well. 70 In contrast, the Kuwaiti government has not moved to stop private fund raising for Salafi groups in Syria, probably because it lacks the legal authority to do so and because it cannot afford to alienate its domestic Salafi opposition, which has been leading the opposition to the royal family's rule. As a result, Salafis in Kuwait are sending millions of dollars to like-minded militants in Syria-a funding advantage that appears to have given Salafi groups an edge in resource acquisition.
Alliance building among Syria's rebels when there is a large ideological disparity between groups, meaningful interaction seems to be less common. This is the case between secular groups and the major Salafi organizations, which largely seem to avoid cooperating with each other, partly out of differences in their respective ideas for Syria's future. Relations between these groups seem to be low and are probably best described as cordial alliances, where the groups tolerate each other but, due to mutual mistrust, tend not to interact. Although rebel commanders complain about the lack of resources, the ability to gain access to low-level resources seems to be something that even small groups can manage to do without developing deep alliances with larger groups. This seems to be one factor that has caused the rebel forces to fracture into smaller and smaller elements and prevented deeper-coordination and militarized-alliances from forming between most rebel groups. For instance, an aspiring local commander from Aleppo explains to another battalion leader why he is splitting from the latter's unit and starting his own group:
A very good man, a seeker of good deeds -he is from our town but he lives in the Gulf -told me he would fund my new battalion. He says he will pay for our ammunition and we get to keep all the spoils of the fighting. We just have to supply him with videos… He wants to appease God, and he wants us to give him videos of all our operations. That's alljust YouTube videos. 74 Thus, for the aspiring commander, the prospect and potential benefits of greater autonomy appear to be sufficient motivation to leave and start his own group. This follows Furtado's argument that groups with similar resource levels are less inclined to seek deeper alliances with each other. The reason is that groups tend to value their autonomy over alliances that do not guarantee access to significantly higher levels of resources. This may be one factor that has stymied progress toward unification and driven the trend of further division among Syria's rebels.
However, it appears that even in this climate shared long-term goals can bring groups together and lead to the development of deeper and more credible ties. This seems to be what has occurred within the Salafi segments of the rebellion. Salafi militants share specific ideological commitments that are in many ways quite different from those of the other major rebel constituencies. With firm commitments to the centrality of Islamic law, the importance of Islamic mores governing all aspects of society, and a deep-seated suspicion of the Muslim Brotherhood and secularists, Salafi groups seem to have had an easier time than their counterparts in forming credible alliances with each other. While it is almost certain that parochial interests 28 could also undermine a complete coming together of Salafi organizations, shared ideological commitments seem to have paved the way for the development of deeper alliances within major Salafi factions like the Syrian Islamic Front.
In addition to shared goals, Salafis have been continually successful in attracting external support. Early in the conflict, the groups associated with the FSA and the Muslim Brotherhood enjoyed the lion's share of outside support. Yet the ineffective distribution of resources has led many small groups to seek patronage from private donors. Private money seems to have enabled Salafi groups to acquire at least the same, or even higher, levels of resources as the other major factions. Although it is difficult to know precisely, on-the-ground reporting and continuous complaints from FSA commanders suggest that Salafis are indeed outpacing others in the acquisition of resources.
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With steady access to resources, smaller unaligned groups could be motivated to join forces or at least seek cooperative and coordination alliances with better-funded Salafis. We have evidence that smaller groups have donned the guise and begun to advocate the Salafi ideology to attract private donors. U. S. House Intelligence Committee Chairman, Rep. Mike Rogers, also touched on this issue: "Certain elements of the rebels are reaching across to these jihadist units, because they tend to be armed and effective and committed fighters, which is more than they can say for their own units at times." 76 It would follow that those groups that have adopted the goals of the leading Salafi organizations could also seek deeper ties with them. This is perhaps in part what has fueled the growth of the Salafi factions, which have continued to increase in size and importance throughout the conflict.
Over time, shared goals and effective access to resources should continue to help Salafi groups engage in deeper levels of cooperation and form more credible alliances with one another. So far, it appears 75 See Abdulrahim, "Syria rebels say they don't have the weapons"; also, Abdul-Ahad, "How to Start a Battalion." 76 Chris Lawrence, "Syrian Rebels said to Cut Deals for Arms from Extremists," CNN, 17 October 2012, http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/10/17/syrian-jihadists-gettingweapons.
29 that Salafi elements have been able to translate their greater resources and likely more credible inter-group ties into success on the battlefield and growing notoriety. For instance, Salafis have become a dominant force in the Aleppo theater and were able to lead-in coordination with other Islamist groups-major victories against regime forces at a military base near Aleppo and at the critical Al-Tabqa hydroelectric dam. 77 Such successes should not only benefit group cohesion and morale, but also make Salafi groups more credible targets for private foreign aid.
In sum, deeper cooperation and shared goals have likely made the Salafis a more coherent bloc than other rebel factions. However, so long as smaller Salafi groups can maintain access to individual lines of outside support, a more dramatic coming together of Salafi groups through a militarized alliance or the absolute absorption of smaller groups into a few major Salafi organizations will likely not take place. Thus, similar to other major factions, the Salafis probably will remain divided to some degree by parochial interests.
Conclusion: What does this mean for Syria's conflict and its future?
The inherent murkiness of civil wars makes it impossible to develop a perfect understanding of the complex dynamics that define them and decide their outcome. The case of Syria is no different: we cannot extrapolate from current evidence and make confident arguments about where the civil war is headed. However, the theoretical framework that we have used in this report gives us a sense of how goals and resources can affect rebel group interaction and impact Syria's civil war more broadly. 
